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We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostro¨m-Felbinger communication protocol ( called ping-
pong protocol ) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement
attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice’s information instead of a most general quantum
operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present
a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low
noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection
probability d should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-
pong protocol in a real communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a protocol to be provably secure, by which private key bit can be created
between two parties over a public channel. The key bits can then be used to implement a classical private key
cryptosystem, such as Vernam cipher [1], some times called a one time pad, to enable the parties to communicate
securely. The basis idea behind QKD is that Eve can not gain any information from the qubit transmitted from Alice
to Bob without disturbing their states. First, the no-cloning theorem forbids Eve to perfectly clone Alice’s qubit.
Secondly, in any attempt to distinguish between two non-orthogonal quantum states, information gain is only possible
at the expense of introducing disturbance to the signal [1]. Since Bennett and Brassard presented the pioneer QKD
work in 1984 [2], there are a lot of quantum communication protocols today [3-11]. Bostro¨m and Filbinger presented
a deterministic secure direct quantum communication protocol called ping-pong protocol with a novel security proof
[7]. They show that the security of the ping-pong protocol is unconditional secure with an abstract mathematics
proof. In this letter, we show a scheme that gives a physical eavesdropping on the ping-pong protocol. Since a real
quantum channel is noisy, we present a modified ping-pong protocol by using Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes [12] and
give a requirement criterion of the upper bound on the detection probability (bit-error ratio).
The ping-pong protocol utilizes the property that one bit of information can be encoded in the states |ψ± >=
1√
2
(|0 > |1 > ±|1 > |0 >), which are completely unavailable to anyone who has access to only one of the qubits. To
gain information from Alice, Bob prepares two qubit in the Bell state |ψ− >. Then he stores one qubit (home qubit)
and sends the other one (travel qubit) to Alice through the quantum channel. Alice can decide the control and the
message mode randomly. In the message mode, Alice performs a unitary operation σAz to encode the information ‘1’
or dose nothing to encode the information ‘0’. Then she sends it back. Bob can get Alice’s information by a Bell
measurement. In control mode, Alice performs a measurement in basis Bz = {|0 >, |1 >}. Using the public channel,
she sends the result to Bob, who then also switches to the control mode and performs a measurement in the same
basis Bz. Bob compares his own result with Alice’s result. If both results coincide, Bob knows that Eve is in line and
stops the communication. Otherwise, Bob sends the next qubit to Alice and the communication continues.
It has been proven that any information Eve gains would make her face a nonzero detection probability. Eve’s aim is
to find out which operation Alice performs. Eve has no access to Bob’s home qubit, so all her operations are restricted
to the travel qubit, whose state is completely indistinguishable from the complete mixture ρA = trB{|ψ+ >< ψ+|} =
1
2
(|0 >< 0|+ |1 >< 1|)A. Bostro¨m and Felbinger presented an unconditional security proof on the ping-pong protocol
[7]. The most quantum operation is a completely positive map ε : S(HA)→ S(HA). One can replace the state of the
travel qubit by the a priori mixture ρA =
1
2
|0 >< 0|+ 1
2
|1 >< 1|, which corresponds to the situation where Bob sends
the travel qubit in either of the states |0 > or |1 >, with equal probability p = 1/2. Consider the case where Bob
sends |0 >. Eve adds an ancilla in the state |χ > and perform a unitary operation E on both systems, resulting in
|ψ′ >= E|0, χ >= α|0, χ0 > +β|1, χ1 > . (1)
Defining that
d = |β|2 = 1− |α|2, (2)
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obviously, d is the detection probability in the control mode for Eve’s attack. It has been proven that when Alice
exactly encodes one bit, the maximal information Eve gain is equal to the Shannon entropy of a binary channel,
I0(d) = −d log2 d− (1− d) log2(1− d). (3)
The function I0(d) has maximum at d = 1/2, giving a monotonous function 0 ≤ d(I0) ≤ 1/2 on the interval [0,1/2],
I0 ∈ [0, 1]. Any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected.
II. A MEASUREMENT EAVESDROPPING ATTACK STRATEGY
In their proof [7], Eve’s attack operation in line B → A is described as a completely positive map operation,
which is an abstract proof. We will show a practical eavesdropping attack scheme which is equivalent to a completely
positive map attack. Consider that
σz|0 > = |0 >, σz|1 >= −|1 >, (4)
σz|+ > = |− >, σz|− >= |+ >, (5)
here |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >). Eve’s aim is to find out which operation Alice performs. She
can eavesdrop Alice’s information by using the strategy that she attacks the travel qubit in line B → A to prepares
the qubit in the state | ↑n>,
| ↑n>= cos θ
2
|0 > +sin θ
2
|1 > (6)
and performs a measurement in the line A→ B to draw Alice’s information.
Let us analyze the connection between information Eve gained and the corresponding detection probability she has
to face. When Alice sends the travel qubit to Bob, Eve can capture the travel qubit in the line B → A. she perform
a measurement in the basis Bz. With probability p = 1/2, she get |0 > or |1 >. Consider that Eve gets the result
|0 >. Then the state of the home qubit is immediately collapse to |1 >. Then Eve prepares the travel qubit in state
| ↑n>. In control mode, the detection probability dm is given
dm =< 1| ↑n><↑n |1 >= sin2 θ
2
. (7)
In message mode, the state of the travel is | ↑n> after Alice encoded ‘0’ and becomes
| ↓n>= cos θ
2
|0 > − sin θ
2
|1 >, (8)
when Alice encoded ‘1’. We calculate the information Eve can gain on this occasion. Practically, Alice encodes ‘0’
and ‘1’ with equal probability. After Alice’s encoding operation, the state of travel becomes
ρ =
1
2
| ↑n><↑n |+ 1
2
| ↓n><↓n |
= cos2
θ
2
|0 >< 0|+ sin2 θ
2
|1 >< 1|. (9)
Then the information Eve can gain from ρ is the classical information entropy
I = − cos2 θ
2
log2 cos
2 θ
2
− sin2 θ
2
log2 sin
2 θ
2
= −dm log2 dm − (1− dm) log2(1− dm). (10)
Assume that Eve’s measurement result is |1 > rather than |0 >. The above calculation can be done in full analogy,
resulting in the same relation. Thus, one can only use measurement attack in the line B → A instead of a completely
postive map operation attack. After Eve’s such attack, the entanglement between travel qubit and home qubit does
not exist. Bob can not gain any information from Alice. The information authentification has to be considered in the
line A→ B.
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III. BOSTRO¨M-FELBINGER COMMUNICATION IN THE NOISY QUANTUM CHANNEL
In the ping-pong protocol [7], it only has been considered in the ideal quantum channel. However, a practical
quantum channel is noisy. The noise can cause the bit errors and the quantum losses. Wo´jcik has discussed the
eavesdropping on the ping-pong protocol hiding in the quantum losses [13]. When Alice and Bob use a noisy quantum
channel, they can not communicate in a direct way, i.e., directly communication must be forbidden. In control mode,
Alice and Bob publish their measurement results. If they find both results coincide, they stop the communication.
In a noisy quantum channel, a spontaneous disentanglement process is inevitable. Both of the results will coincide
with a nonzero probability. Alice and Bob can not distinguish whether Eve is in line. The communication has to be
stopped.
In a noise quantum channel, direct communication must be forbidden. One can use the ping-pong protocol to
complete a quantum key distribution with CSS codes [12]. Consider a quantum CSS code Q on n qubits comes from
two binary codes on n bits, C1 and C2, one contained in the other:
{0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Zn2 , (11)
where Zn2 is the binary vector space on n bits. Suppose x ∈ C1 is any codeword in the code C1. Then we defined the
quantum state |x+ C2 > by
|x+ C2 >≡ 1√
C2
∑
y∈C2
|x+ y >, (12)
where + is bitwise addition modulo 2. Suppose that x′ is an element of C1 such that x − x′ ∈ C2. Then it has that
|x+C2 >= |x′+C2 >. Hence these codewords correspond to coset of C2 in C1, and this code protects a Hilbert space
of dimension 2dimC1−dimC2 . Since Eve may use a measurement attack in line B → A, the information authentification
has to be considered in line A → B. The ping-pong protocol can be modified as below. The modified ping-pong
protocol.—(1) Alice creates random n+m+ l bits where m and l is determined by the control parameter c. (2) Alice
chooses a random (n+m+ l)-bit string b. She choose a random vk ∈ C1. (3) Bob creates m+n+ l EPR pairs in state
|ψ− >. (4) Bob sends half of each EPR pair to Alice and keeps the others. (5) Alice receives n+m+ l qubits. She
performs a measurement in basis Bz on the m qubit according to b. Alice announces the measurement results and
which qubits she measured.(6) Bob also measurement m qubit. If Bob finds more than t of the measurement results
coincide, he aborts the protocol. (7) Alice has an n− bit string x. She performs encoding operation on the n qubit
according to x. And does nothing on the l−qubit (encoded ‘0’). And sends the resulting qubits back to Bob. (8)
Bob receives these qubits and performs a Bell-basis measurements on each EPR pair. (9) Alice announce b. If Bob
finds more than t′ of the l−code is ‘1’, he aborts this protocol. (10) Alice announces x− vk. Bob subtracts this from
his result, correcting it with code C1 to obtain vk. (11) Alice and Bob compute the coset of vk + C2 in C1 to obtain
the key k. This modified ping-pong protocol not only can protect this communication against Eve’s eavesdropping,
but also can protect this communication against Eve’s attack without eavesdropping [14]. This modified ping-pong
protocol can be used in low noisy quantum channel.
The security of a protocol is based on
I(A : B) > min[I(A : E), I(B : E)], (13)
where I(A : B) = H(A) + H(B) − H(AB), H is the Shannon entropy [15]. Assume that the detection is sin2 α,
0 ≤ α ≤ pi
4
. In this case, the maximal information Eve can gain is determined by equation (3), I(A : E) = I0(sin
2 α).
We will analyze the maximal information Bob can gain from Alice when d = sin2 α. The state Alice and Bob shared
after Eve’s attack should satisfies the condition d = sin2 α. And we want to keeps the entanglement as maximal as
possible. If the entanglement does not exist any longer, Bob can get nothing from Alice. Although the entanglement
is not sufficient, it is necessary in the communication protocol. According to the qualification described above, the
state may be written in the form as
|Ω > = cosα|ψ− > +sinα|φ+ > (14)
=
1√
2
(|0 > |b+ > −|1 > |b− >), (15)
where |φ+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > +|1 > |1 >), and |b+ >= cosα|1 > +sinα|0 >, |b− >= cosα|0 > − sinα|1 >. Clearly,
|Ω > is a maximal entangled state. When Alice performs an encoding operation σAz , the state |Ω > becomes |Ω′ >
3
|Ω′ >= cosα|ψ+ > +sinα|φ− >, (16)
where |φ− >= 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > −|1 > |1 >). Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement on the EPR pair. With probability
cos2 α, he obtains Alice’s codes. With the probability sin2 α, she gains the wrong codes. Hence the information Bob
gained is
I(A : B) = 1− [− cos2 α log2(cos2 α)− sin2 α log2(sin2 α)]. (17)
The security of this protocol requires that I(A : B) > I(A : E). In this case, we can gain the detection probability
d = sin2 α < 0.11. So we gain a weak criterion that the detection probability d should be lower than 0.11, d < 0.11.
Since the security of quantum communication should be unconditional, then the criterion d < 0.11 should be treated as
a requirement. According to our modified ping-pong protocol, either t/m or t′/l higher than 0.11, the communication
protocol should be aborted immediately.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In an ideal quantum channel, a direct communication as a real one-time-pad key has been discussed a lot [7, 10,
16,17]. In a noisy quantum channel, direct communication has to be abandoned. Alice and Bob can not distinguish
whether bit-error was caused by noise or caused by Eve. So the communication has to be stopped.. Fortunately, we
can use the direct communication to complete the quantum key distribution in a noisy quantum channel.
In the ping-pong protocol, for Eve, a measurement attack in line B → A is equal to a completely positive map
operation attack. But the entanglement between home qubit and travel qubit disappears under such attack. Bob
can not gain any information from Alice. We present a modified ping-pong protocol which can be used to complete
quantum key distribution in noisy quantum channel. In our modified protocol, security on both line A→ B and line
B → A has been proven. We give a requirement criterion that the bit-error ratio has to be lower than 0.11, which is
an important criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.
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